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Abstract
The acyclicity of individual improvements in a generalized congestion game (where the sums of
local utilities are replaced with arbitrary aggregation rules) can be established with a Rosenthal-
style construction if aggregation rules of all players are \quasi-separable." Every universal separable
ordering on a nite set can be represented as a combination of addition and lexicography.
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1 Introduction
Rosenthal's (1973) construction proved extremely fruitful in the study of networks games, group forma-
tion, etc.; it was also a source of inspiration for researchers, even in areas rather distant in a technical
sense (Milchtaich, 1996; Holzman and Law-Yone, 1997; Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber, 1997; Sand-
holm, 2010; McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky, 2011; Harks, Klimm, and Mohring, 2011). Monderer
and Shapely (1996) built their theory of potential games around it.
Kukushkin (2007) showed the crucial role of addition by introducing the notion of a generalized
congestion game, where the players may aggregate local utilities in an arbitrary way rather than
just summing them up. Then the sum was proven to be necessary (assuming continuity and strict
monotonicity) to ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium regardless of all other characteristics of
the game.
This paper follows the same line of inquiry, but with even more purely technical avor. First, we
show that Rosenthal's construction can be reproduced, with only trivial modication, if the preferences
of all players are \quasi-separable," i.e., consistent with a universal separable ordering (Proposition 1).
This applies, e.g., to the minimum (\weakest-link") aggregation, which is not separable, but is consis-
tent with the leximin ordering.
Second, we show that every universal separable ordering on a nite set can be represented as
a combination of addition and lexicography (Theorem 2). This result can be viewed as a discrete
analogue of the famous Debreu{Gorman Theorem (Debreu, 1960; Gorman, 1968; see also Wakker,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Dorodnicyn Computing Center, 40, Vavilova, Moscow 119333 Russian Federation.
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1989), even though it cannot claim anything approaching the importance of the latter. We abandon
the assumption that the ordering is continuous on a connected domain; instead, we require the ordering
to be applicable to every Cartesian power of a given nite set (like the sum, or leximin/leximax).
The message of this paper can be summarized in two opposite ways. On one hand, we found that
Rosenthal's construction can work for a broader class of preferences than originally envisaged. On the
other hand, this generalization can be viewed as inessential, and hence Theorem 2 interpreted as an
impossibility result.
The following section contains basic denitions; Sections 3 and 4, the main results. Some questions
of secondary importance are discussed in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 summarizes the message of the
paper.
2 Basics
A strategic game   is dened by a nite set N of players, and a set Xi of strategies and a utility function
ui on the set XN :=
Q
i2N Xi of strategy proles for each i 2 N . We always assume each Xi to be
nite.
Given i 2 N , we denote X i :=
Q
j 6=iXj . With every strategic game, we associate the individual
improvement relation on XN (i 2 N , yN ; xN 2 XN ):
yN .i xN 
 [y i = x i & ui(yN ) > ui(xN )];
yN . xN 
 9i 2 N [yN .i xN ]:
A Nash equilibrium is a maximizer of ., i.e., a strategy prole xN 2 XN such that yN . xN holds for
no yN 2 XN .
In the terminology of Monderer and Shapley (1996), a function P : XN ! R is an exact potential
of   if ui(yN )   ui(xN ) = P (yN )   P (xN ) whenever i 2 N , yN ; xN 2 XN , and y i = x i. A function
P : XN ! R is a generalized ordinal potential of the game if P (yN ) > P (xN ) whenever yN ; xN 2 XN
and yN . xN . Clearly, every exact potential is also a generalized ordinal potential.
Being interested in games with ordinal preferences here and following Kukushkin (1999), we dene
a potential of   as an irreexive and transitive relation  on XN satisfying
8xN ; yN 2 XN [yN . xN ) yN  xN ]: (1)
Since XN is nite, the existence of a potential in our sense is equivalent to the existence of a generalized
ordinal potential (Monderer and Shapley 1996, Lemma 2.5); and it obviously implies the existence of
a Nash equilibrium.
A congestion game (Rosenthal, 1973) may have an arbitrary nite set N of players, while strategies
and preferences are dened by the following construction. There are a nite set A of facilities and
a local utility function ' : N ! R for each  2 A; each xi 2 Xi (i 2 N) is a subset of A. Given
xN 2 XN , we denote N(; xN ) := fi 2 N j  2 xig and n(; xN ) := #N(; xN ) for each  2 A. Now
the utility function of each player i is
ui(xN ) :=
X
2xi
'(n(; xN )): (2)
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In the most popular interpretation, A is the set of edges of a (directed) graph and each Xi consists
of paths with a given origin and a given target. Under this interpretation, it is natural to assume each
' to be decreasing (congestion proper). However, such assumptions are not needed for the most basic
results about congestion games; they were not made in Rosenthal (1973), and are not made here.
For every congestion game, the function
P (xN ) :=
X
2A
n(;xN )X
k=1
'(k) (3)
is an exact potential (Rosenthal, 1973); therefore, the strict ordering onXN represented by the function,
yN  xN 
 P (yN ) > P (xN ), is a potential in the sense of (1).
The notion of a generalized congestion game was introduced in Kukushkin (2007). Roughly speak-
ing, it is a game with the same structure of strategy sets as a congestion game proper, but with the sum
in (2) replaced with an arbitrary function. Somewhat simplifying that notion, we assume that each
player is characterized by a universal aggregation rule, i.e., an innite sequence of symmetric functions
U
(m)
i : V
m ! R (m 2 N), where V  R, and that her utility function is
ui(xN ) := U
(#xi)
i
 

'(n(; xN ))

2xi

:
Naturally, this formula only makes sense if all values of the functions ' belong to V . Since U
(#xi)
i
is symmetric, there is no need to specify an order on xi. In the following, we employ the term an
unordered cortege (of the length #xi), i.e., a collection of real numbers with possible repetitions. It is
natural to assume every U
(m)
i to be increasing in its arguments, but such an explicit assumption is not
needed here.
3 Quasiseparable aggregation
A universal separable ordering  on V  R is an innite sequence of orderings, i.e., reexive, transitive,
and total binary relations, m on V m (m 2 N; we denote m and m, respectively, its asymmetric and
symmetric components) such that
1. 1 is the standard order  on V induced from R;
2. for every permutation  of f1; : : : ;mg,
hv1; : : : ; vmi m hv(1); : : : ; v(m)i
(symmetry); by this condition, every relation m can be perceived as dened on the set of un-
ordered corteges of the length m;
3. for every m0 > m  1, every hv1; : : : ; vm0i 2 V m0 , and every hv01; : : : ; v0mi 2 V m,
hv1; : : : ; vm; vm+1; : : : ; vm0i m0 hv01; : : : ; v0m; vm+1; : : : ; vm0i () hv1; : : : ; vmi m hv01; : : : ; v0mi
(separability).
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A universal aggregation rule U is consistent with a universal separable ordering  if there is an
innite sequence fvm 2 V gm=2;3;::: such that for every m0  m, every hv1; : : : ; vmi 2 V m, and every
hv01; : : : ; v0m0i 2 V m
0
,
U (m
0)(v01; : : : ; v
0
m0) > U
(m)(v1; : : : ; vm)) hv01; : : : ; v0m0i m
0 hv1; : : : ; vm; vm+1; : : : ; vm0i (4a)
and
U (m)(v1; : : : ; vm) > U
(m0)(v01; : : : ; v
0
m0)) hv1; : : : ; vm; vm+1; : : : ; vm0i m
0 hv01; : : : ; v0m0i: (4b)
It seems reasonable to call such aggregation rules quasiseparable.
Proposition 1. Let  be a universal separable ordering on V  R, and   be a generalized congestion
game where '(N)  V for each  2 A and each player's aggregation rule Ui is consistent with .
Then   admits a potential in the sense of (1).
Proof. Let vik be constants associated with the aggregation rule used by player i; we denote Mi :=
maxxi2Xi #xi and M :=
P
i2N Mi. With every xN 2 XN , we associate an unordered cortege:
{(xN ) :=
D
h'(k)i2A;k=1;:::;n(;xN ); hvikii2N;k=#xi+1;:::;Mi
E
(assuming the convention that facilities  2 A with n(; xN ) = 0 are not represented in {(xN ) at
all). It is easy to check that
P
i#xi =
P
 n(; xN ); therefore, the length of {(xN ) is M for every
xN 2 XN . If we show that yN . xN implies {(yN ) M {(xN ), (1) will be proven with M as .
Let yN .i xN , i.e., ui(yN ) > ui(xN ) and y i = x i. A is partitioned into four disjoint subsets:
A0 := xi \ yi, A+ := yi n xi, A  := xi n yi, A := A n (xi [ yi); thus, xi = A0 [ A  and yi = A0 [ A+.
Denoting m := maxf#xi;#yig, we dene
{ i :=
D
h'(k)i2A0;k=1;:::;n(;xN ) 1=n(;yN ) 1; h'(k)i2A+;k=1;:::;n(;xN )=n(;yN ) 1;
h'(k)i2A ;k=1;:::;n(;yN )=n(;xN ) 1; h'(k)i2A;k=1;:::;n(;xN )=n(;yN );
hvjkij2N;j 6=i;k=#xj+1;:::;Mj ; hvikik= m+1;:::;Mi
E
(under a similar convention).
Let #yi  #xi. We dene
{i(xN ) :=
D
h'(n(; xN ))i2A0[A  ; hvikik=#xi+1;:::;#yi
E
and
{i(yN ) :=
D
'(n(; yN ))
E
2A0[A+

=
D
'(n(; yN ))
E
2yi

:
Since ui(yN ) > ui(xN ), we have {i(yN ) m {i(xN ) by condition (4a).
If #yi  #xi, we dene
{i(xN ) :=
D
'(n(; xN ))
E
2A0[A 

=
D
'(n(; xN ))
E
2xi

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and
{i(yN ) :=
D
h'(n(; yN ))i2A0[A+ ; hvikik=#yi+1;:::;#xi
E
:
In either case, {(xN ) = h{ i;{i(xN )i and {(yN ) = h{ i;{i(yN )i. Conditions ui(yN ) > ui(xN )
and (4b) imply {i(yN ) m {i(xN ). Now we have {(yN ) M {(xN ) by separability.
The simplest and most important example of a universal separable ordering is given by the additive
aggregation rule:
v0 m v ()
mX
k=1
(v0k) 
mX
k=1
(vk); (5)
where  : R ! R is strictly increasing. Thus, Rosenthal's (1973) congestion games are covered by
Proposition 1 with this ordering, (v) = v, and vm = 0 for all m. Moreover, the construction in the
proof generates exactly the potential (3) in this case.
At a rst glance, dierent () and vm 6= 0 provide a more general result, but this is, in a sense, an
illusion; it may be worthwhile to consider the situation in more detail. Let each player i in a generalized
congestion game   use a universal aggregation rule Ui consistent with the additive ordering (5); the
conditions (4) imply that player i's utility function is (up to a monotonic transformation)
ui(xN ) =
X
2xi
('(n(; x))) +
MiX
k=#xi+1
vik:
Obviously, we can represent   as a congestion game, redening '(k) = ('(k)), adding to A new
facilities (i;m), i 2 N , 1  m  Mi, dening '(i;m)(1) = vim, and replacing each xi 2 Xi with
xi [ f(i;#xi + 1); : : : ; (i;Mi)g.
A number of similar \pseudo-generalizations" of Rosenthal's construction were discussed in Kukush-
kin (2007, Section 4).
Another example of a universal separable ordering is the leximin: when comparing two lists of local
utility values, we start with the worst in either list; in the case of equality, we move to the second
worst, etc. The minimum (\weakest-link") aggregation,
U (m)(v1; : : : ; vm) := min
k=1;:::;m
(vk);
is consistent with this ordering (strictly speaking, we must modify our denition in this case, allowing
vik = +1) although not separable itself. A similar connection exists between the maximum (\best-
shot") aggregation and the leximax ordering. Thus, Rosenthal's construction of a potential, as modied
in the proof of Proposition 1, can work in both these cases.
Finally, we may go ordinal the whole way, and assume that the preferences of the players may
be described by orderings without numeric representations. Then the leximin or leximax orderings
themselves will be eligible.
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4 Universal separable orderings on a nite set
Theorem 2. For every nite set V  R and every universal separable ordering  on V; there are a
natural number n < #V and a mapping  : V ! Rn such that
hv01; : : : ; v0mi m hv1; : : : ; vmi ()
mX
k=1
(v0k) Lex
mX
k=1
(vk) (6)
for every m 2 N and v01; : : : ; v0m; v1; : : : ; vm 2 V; where the sums in the right-hand side are understood
coordinate-wise, and Lex denotes the lexicographic order on Rn : rst the rst coordinate matters,
then the second, etc.
Proof. Whenever v; v0 2 V , it will be convenient to denote the ordered pair [v; v0] and call it an interval.
An interval [v; v0] is positive if v0  v. A formal sum Pmk=1[vk; v0k] is called positive if
hv01; : : : ; v0mi m hv1; : : : ; vmi: (7)
The empty sum is also assumed positive. Since some intervals in such a sum may be identical, we also
have a notion of a positive linear combination
Pm
k=1 k[vk; v
0
k] with nonnegative integer k. Assuming
 [vk; v0k] = [v0k; vk], we extend the notion to negative k as well.
We denote Q the eld of rational numbers and Q the vector space (over Q) of all formal linear
combinations
Pm
k=1 rk[vk; v
0
k] of positive intervals in V with rational coecients. Then we dene Q+
as the set of I 2 Q that are positive in the sense of (7) or become positive after multiplication by an
n 2 N.
Lemma 4.1. Q+ is a half-space in Q, i.e.,
8I; I 0 2 Q+

(I + I 0) 2 Q+

; (8a)
8I 2 Q+ 8r 2 Q

r  0) rI 2 Q+

; (8b)
8I 2 Q I 2 Q+ or ( I) 2 Q+: (8c)
Proof. We start with (8a). If nI and n0I 0 are positive integer combinations, then so are n0nI and n0nI 0
too. Let n0nI =
Pm
k=1[vk; v
0
k] and n
0nI 0 =
Pm0
k=m+1[vk; v
0
k]. Applying (7) and the separability of m,
we obtain
hv01; : : : ; v0m; v0m+1; : : : ; v0m0i m
0 hv1; : : : ; vm; v0m+1; : : : ; v0m0i m
0 hv1; : : : ; vm; vm+1; : : : ; vm0i;
i.e., n0n(I + I 0) is a positive integer combination. The proof of (8b) is even simpler. (8c) immediately
follows from the completeness of m.
Now we dene
I 0 > I 
 (I 0   I) 2 Q+
for all I 0; I 2 Q. Clearly, > is an ordering; we dene  and ' as its asymmetric and symmetric
components, respectively. By Lemma 4.1, > is consistent with addition in a natural sense.
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Since every m is symmetric, we have
[v; v0] + [v0; v00] ' [v; v00] (9)
whenever v; v0; v00 2 V and v  v0  v00.
Let I 0; I 2 Q and I  0; we say that I 0 is not Archimedean dominated by I, I 0 >> I, if there is
an integer k such that kI 0  I. For I  0, we dene I 0 >> I 
 9k [kI 0   I]. Adding I >> 0 by
denition for all I 2 Q, we obtain an ordering; its asymmetric and symmetric components are denoted
o and , respectively. When I 0  I, we say that I 0 and I have the same Archimedean rank. Thus, Q
is partitioned into equivalence classes of . By denition, I and  I have the same Archimedean rank
for every I 2 Q. If I 0o I, then I 0  I   I 0 if I 0  0, while  I 0  I  I 0 otherwise.
Whenever I0  0 and I0 >> I > 0, we dene
I=I0 := supfr 2 Q j I > rI0g 2 R
(an attempt to apply the denition to I o I0 would produce I=I0 = +1). When I  0, we dene
I=I0 :=  [( I)=I0] = inffr 2 Q j rI0 > Ig.
Lemma 4.2. Let I; I 0; I0 2 Q, I0  0, I0 >> I 0, I0 >> I, and r 2 Q. Then
(I 0 + I)=I0 = (I 0=I0) + (I=I0);
(rI)=I0 = r(I=I0);
I0o I () I=I0 = 0:
Proof. The proof consists of rather tedious checks. Let I 0  0 and I  0; then for every r 2 Q
such that r < (I 0=I0) + (I=I0), we can nd r1; r2 2 Q such that r1 + r2 = r, r1 < I 0=I0, and
r2 < I=I0. By denition, I
0  r1I0 and I  r2I0, hence (I 0 + I)  rI0; since r was arbitrary,
(I 0 + I)=I0  (I 0=I0) + (I=I0). Conversely, for every r 2 Q such that r > (I 0=I0) + (I=I0), we can nd
r1; r2 2 Q such that r1 + r2 = r, r1 > I 0=I0, and r2 > I=I0. By denition, I 0  r1I0 and I  r2I0,
hence (I 0 + I) rI0; since r was arbitrary, (I 0 + I)=I0  (I 0=I0) + (I=I0).
Turning to negative intervals, it is enough to consider I 0  0, I  0, and I 0   I  0; then for
every r 2 Q such that r < (I 0=I0)   (I=I0), we can nd r1; r2 2 Q such that r1   r2 = r, r1 < I 0=I0,
and r2 > I=I0. By denition, I
0  r1I0 and I  r2I0, hence (I 0   I)  rI0; since r was arbitrary,
(I 0   I)=I0  (I 0=I0)  (I=I0). The converse inequality is obtained in a similar way.
Checking the second equality, we may assume I  0 and r > 0; then rI > rr0I0 () I > r0I0.
As to the last equivalence, it is again sucient to consider I  0. If nI > I0, then I=I0  1=n > 0.
Conversely, if I=I0 > 0, then I > rI0 for every r 2 Q such that 0 < r < I=I0, hence (1=r)I > I0, hence
I >> I0.
Lemma 4.3. For every nite-dimensional vector subspace L  Q, there is a natural number n  dimL
and a mapping  : L! Rn such that  is linear over Q and
8I 0; I 2 L [I 0 > I () (I 0) Lex (I)]: (11)
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Proof. Let I1; : : : ; Ih be a basis of L; without restricting generality, I1 >> Ik  0 for all k. For every
I 2 L, we set q(I) := I=I1. By Lemma 4.2, q : L! R is linear over Q. If dimL = 1, then L = frI1gr2Q
and we are home, by (8b), with  := q.
Otherwise, we argue by induction in dimL. Since q(I1) = 1, the kernel of q, K = fI 2 L j q(I) = 0g,
is a proper vector subspace of L. By the induction hypothesis, there is a linear operator 0 : K ! Rm
with m < dimL representing > on K in the sense of (11). Now we x a projection p : L ! K, i.e., a
linear operator such that p(I) = I whenever I 2 K, and dene  : L! Rm+1 by (I) := hq(I); 0(p(I))i
for every I 2 L. Checking that  represents > on L is straightforward: if q(I 0) > q(I), then obviously
I 0  I; if q(I 0) = q(I), then (I 0   I) 2 K, hence (I 0) Lex (I) () 0(I 0) Lex 0(I) () I 0 >
I.
Let V = fv0; v1; : : : ; v mg with vk < vk+1 for every relevant k. We call each [vk; vk+1] an ele-
mentary interval and denote E the set of elementary intervals. For each vk 2 V , we set {(vk) :=Pk 1
h=0[v
h; vh+1] 2 Q, so {(v0) = 0. Applying Lemma 4.3 with L = Q(E), we obtain appropriate
n  #E = #V   1 and .
Now let m 2 N and v01; : : : ; v0m; v1; : : : ; vm 2 V be given. By the denition (7), hv01; : : : ; v0mi m
hv1; : : : ; vmi if and only if
Pm
k=1[vk; v
0
k] > 0; by (9), [vk; v0k] '
 
{(v0k)  {(vk)

. Therefore,
hv01; : : : ; v0mi m hv1; : : : ; vmi ()
mX
k=1
{(v0k) >
mX
k=1
{(vk):
By Lemma 4.3,
mX
k=1
{(v0k) >
mX
k=1
{(vk) ()
mX
k=1
({(v0k)) Lex
mX
k=1
({(vk)):
Dening  : V ! Rn as  =   {, we obtain (6). Theorem 2 is proven.
Proposition 3. Given V  R, a natural number n, and a mapping  : V ! Rn, the sequence of
relations m dened by (6) constitutes a universal separable ordering on V if and only if  is strictly
increasing.
A straightforward proof is omitted.
Theorem 2 and Proposition 3 together provide a characterization of universal separable orderings
on a nite set.
As an example, let us consider how representation (6) can be obtained for a universal separable
ordering where, at a rst glance, addition has no place, viz. the leximin ordering. We set n := #E =
#V   1, i.e., V = fv0; v1; : : : ; vng with vk < vk+1 for all k. For each v 2 V and k = 1; : : : ; n, we
dene k(v) := 1 if v  vk and k(v) := 0 otherwise. Given a list v1; : : : ; vm, we immediately see thatPm
k=1 1(vk) = m   #fk 2 f1; : : : ;mg j vk = v0g,
Pm
k=1 2(vk) = m   #fk 2 f1; : : : ;mg j vk  v1g,
etc. Therefore, the lexicographic comparison of these sums produces the leximin ordering indeed.
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5 Separability on innite domains
The niteness of the set V was not needed in Proposition 3; however, the proof of Theorem 2 collapses
without the assumption. Moreover, it seems implausible that nite lexicography could be sucient to
represent every separable ordering, e.g., the leximin ordering, even on V = N.
To keep the hope for a characterization result alive, we need a notion of lexicography with innitely
many indices. Two, at least, independent versions of such a notion are available.
Let B be a well ordered set. Then a lexicographic order Lex on RB is dened in essentially the
same way as on Rn. Comparing two vectors from RB, we nd the least coordinate  2 B where they
dier (B is well ordered!) and decide accordingly.
Proposition 4. Given a set V  R, a well ordered set B, and a mapping  : V ! RB, the sequence of
relations m dened by (6) constitutes a universal separable ordering on V if and only if  is strictly
increasing.
A straightforward proof is omitted.
Unfortunately, there is no ground to expect the class of universal separable orderings described
in Proposition 4 to be exhaustive. An alternative way to dene lexicography without niteness looks
more promising although there is no clear-cut result as yet.
Let there be a set W and a list of functions  : W ! R indexed by a parameter  2 B; we call
the list pseudo-nite if for every w 2 W , (w) = 0 except for a nite number of  2 B. Given a
pseudo-nite list with B linearly ordered, we dene the lexicographic order on W in a natural way:
w0 >Lex w 
 9 2 B

(w
0) > (w) & 80 <  [0(w0)  0(w)]

;
w0 Lex w 


w0 >Lex w or 8 2 B [(w0) = (w)]

:
It is easy to see that Lex is an ordering.
Proposition 5. Let there be a set V  R, a chain B, and a pseudo-nite list of functions  : V ! R
( 2 B) such that v0 >Lex v whenever v0; v 2 V and v0 > v. For each m 2 N, we denote m the ordering
Lex dened by the list of functions
m (v1; : : : ; vm) :=
mX
k=1
(vk): (12)
Then the sequence of m is a universal separable ordering on V .
A straightforward proof is omitted.
The leximin ordering can be represented by pseudo-nite lexicography as in Proposition 5 without
any restrictions on the domain. Given a set V  R, we set B := V and dene, for every v 2 V ,
v(v) =  1 and w(v) = 0 for all w 6= v. It is easily checked that the list is pseudo-nite. It is equally
easily to see that the functions mv dened by (12) count how many times every particular v 2 V enters
the list v1; : : : ; vm; hence lexicographic comparison leads to the leximin ordering in essentially the same
way as at the end of Section 4.
The leximax ordering, and hence the maximum aggregation rule, can be treated dually.
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6 On symmetry
In our denition of a universal aggregation rule, we demanded every U (m) to be symmetric. In principle,
we could proceed without this restriction, assuming that the strategies in a generalized congestion game
are corteges rather than subsets. Without symmetry, however, we would not be able to reproduce
Rosenthal's construction of a potential; moreover, even the existence of a Nash equilibrium could not
be guaranteed.
Proposition 6. Let U (m) : V m ! R, where V  R, have the property that every generalized congestion
game where #Xi = m for each strategy of each player, '(N)  V for each  2 A, and each player
aggregates local utilities with U (m) possesses a Nash equilibrium. Then U (m) must be symmetric.
Proof. Otherwise, swapping two arguments over would change the value of U (m). Without restricting
generality, we may assume u+ = U (m)(v1; v2; v3; : : : ; vm) > U
(m)(v2; v1; v3; : : : ; vm) = u
  for some
v1; v2; v3; : : : ; vm 2 V .
Now let us consider a generalized congestion game where: N := f1; 2g; the facilities A := fa; b; c; dg[
fekgk=3;:::;m; X1 :=
ha; b; e3; : : : ; emi; hc; d; e3; : : : ; emi	; X2 := hd; a; e3; : : : ; emi; hb; c; e3; : : : ; emi	;
't(1) := v1 and 't(2) := v2 for each t 2 fa; b; c; dg, while 'ek(2) := vk for all k = 3; : : : ;m; each player
i 2 N aggregates local utilities with U (m).
The 2 2 matrix of the game looks as follows:
da bc
ab (u ; u+) (u+; u )
cd (u+; u ) (u ; u+):
There is no Nash equilibrium in the game.
Remark. Neither continuity, nor monotonicity of U (m) were needed in the proof. Thus, this result
generalizes Lemmas B.1 and B.2 from Kukushkin (2007).
7 Conclusion
To summarize, Proposition 1 shows that Rosenthal's (1973) construction hinges on the separability of
additive aggregation. Very technically speaking, we thus found that the same construction can work
for a broader class of preferences than originally envisaged.
On the other hand, this generalization is, to a large extent, illusory. In a particular quasi-separable
generalized congestion game (with a nite number of players and a nite number of facilities) only a
nite number of m and a nite set V of possible values of local utilities can be relevant. By Theorem 2,
every m admits a representation (6) on V ; and the lexicographic ordering on Rn obviously admits a
scalar additive representation (5) on every nite subset. Thus, the main ndings of this paper might
as well be described as an impossibility result: for Rosenthal's construction to be applicable to a
generalized congestion game, the preferences must admit an additive representation.
On the other other hand, if more players or facilities are added to a game, the representation (5)
may become invalid and have to be modied. Therefore, one can argue that a combination of addition
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and lexicography as in Theorem 2 does not admit a single representation (5) suitable for all occasions,
and hence such combinations do, indeed, dene a broader class of preferences for which Rosenthal's
approach can work.
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